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1 Introduction
This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Proba-
bilistic Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an
equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environ-
ment where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benev-
olents. In a normative approach, one of the most important achievements
in deriving an optimal taxation was that a reduction in the compensated
demand for a good should be small if the social marginal utility of income
for a person h multiplied by the demand of that good by the same person is
large. As a consequence, if good k is largely demanded by people whose so-
ciety attributes a large social marginal evaluation, this good should be taxed
less. Thus the Ramsey’s rule is able to provide useful suggestions not only in
terms of efficiency but also in terms of equity. The poor, who traditionally
are those who have a large personal marginal utility of income should be
taxed less and, obviously, this is a great achievement for the society welfare.
2 Framework
Suppose a society where there are h = 1, ...,H social groups and where the
utility of an individual is given by k = 1, ...,K issues plus consumption A
representative individual of the h-th social group maximises the following
utility function:
maxUh(ch, xh1 , ..., x
h
k , ψ
h
1 , ..., ψ
h
k ) (1)
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where ψk represents the percentage of mindedness devoted to the k issue.
Furthermore, I assume that ∂U
h
∂xh
k
> 0 and ∂U
h
∂ψh
k
> 0. The budget constraint
is given by:
ch =
∑
k
p˜hkx
h
k (2)
where phk = qk − τhk , where qk is the gross price of the issue (equal for every
group) and τhk the marginal tax rate on that issue. To solve the individual
problem I write the Lagrangian function:
L = Uh(ch, xh1 , ..., x
h
k , ψ
h
1 , ..., ψ
h
k ) + µ
h(ch −
∑
k
p˜kx
h
k) (3)
I write the Focs:
∂L
∂x1
=
∂Uh
∂xh1
= 0
...
∂L
∂xk
=
∂Uh
∂xhk
= 0
∂L
∂µh
= ch =
∑
k
p˜hkx
h
k
Obtain the optimal Marshallian demands:
xˆk = xk(p˜k, ψhk ) (4)
Write the IUF:
V h = Uh(x1(p˜1, ψh1 ), ..., xk(p˜k, ψ
h
k ), ψ
h
1 , ..., ψ
h
k ) (5)
Government maximizes a PVM maximand:
1
2
+
d
s
∑
h
nhsh(V h(qA)− V h(qB)) (6)
subject to a balanced budget constraint (see Lindbeck and Weibull):∑
h
∑
i
τhk x
h
knh = 0 (7)
where in a SMT framework:
si = s(xik)
Solving the problem, we obtain the Focs:
∂L
∂τk
=
∑
h
nh
∂sh
∂qhk
(V h(qA)−V h(qB))+nhsh∂V
h(qA)
∂qhk
+λ
∑
h
nh(xhk+
∑
i
τk
∂xhk
∂qhk
) = 0
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In a SMT equilibrium must be:
qA = qB
that is the policies chosen by the two candidates must be the same. and
thus:
V (qA)− V (qB) = 0
I re-write the Focs:
∂L
∂τk
=
∑
h
nhsh
∂V h(qA)
∂qhk
+ λ
∑
h
nh(xhk +
∑
i
τk
∂xhk
∂qhk
) = 0
From the Roy’s identity: ∂V
h(qA)
∂qh
k
= (−µh)xhk , which represents the social
marginal utility of income for person h, or the social evaluation of the in-
crease in utility of person h made possible when h is endowed with an extra
unit of numeraire. Substituting we obtain:
∂L
∂τk
=
∑
h
nhsh(−µh)xhk + λ
∑
h
nh(xhk +
∑
i
τk
∂xhk
∂qhk
) = 0
From the Slutsky equation we know that:
∂xhi
∂qk
= Shik − xhk
∂xhk
∂ch
Rearranging and divide by
∑
h x
h
k
∂L
∂τk
= −
∑
h s
hµhxhk∑
i x
h
k
+ λ+ λ
∑
h
∑
i τkS
h
ik∑
i x
h
k
− λ
∑
h
∑
i τkx
h
k
∂xhk
∂ch∑
h x
h
k
= 0
Divide by λ :
∂L
∂τk
=
∑
h
∑
i τkS
h
ik∑
i x
h
k
=
∑
h s
hµhxhk
λ
∑
i x
h
k
− 1 +
∑
h
∑
i τkx
h
k
∂xhk
∂ch∑
h x
h
k
(8)
The great achievement of the optimal taxation in a PVM with SMT
stands in the analysis of the RHS of 8; in particular if we assume that this
is negative, we may state that the reduction in the compensated demand
for issue k should be small (in absolute value) as
∑
h s
hµhxhk is large. But∑
h s
hµhxhk is larger, the larger is s
h, and since we have assumed that
sh is a monotonically increasing function in some issue, this even-
tually means that the reduction in the compensated demand for
issue k should be lower for those social groups which ”‘consume”’
that issue more! In other words 8 states that the Government
should tax less those social groups who have higher level of den-
sity because they get higher levels of consumption for those issues.
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Secondly, the formula also suggests that groups who gain from a reduc-
tion in the taxation for issues where they are more single-minded,
may experiment an increase in the taxation for other issues where
they are less single-minded at the same time. Consider now a change
in the total welfare resulting from a small change in τk; we obtain:
∂L
∂τk
= −
∑
h
sh
∂V h(qA)
∂ch
xhk + λ
∑
h
(xhk +
∑
k
τk
∂xhk
∂τhj
) = 0
∂L
∂τk
= λ
∑
h
xhk −
∑
h
sh
∂V h(qA)
∂ch
xhk + λθk = 0
where θk =
∑
h
∑
k τk
∂xhk
∂τhj
, which can be thought of as the marginal dead-
weight loss or indirect change in revenue arising from the tax change. Divide
by
∑
h x
h
k and define θ˜k =
θk∑
h
xh
k
as the normalised marginal deadweight loss
∂L
∂τk
= λ−
∑
h s
h ∂V
h(qA)
∂ch
xhk∑
h x
h
k
+ λθ˜k = 0
∂L
∂τk
= λ(1 + θ˜k) =
∑
h s
h ∂V
h(qA)
∂ch
xhk∑
h x
h
k
θ˜k =
∑
h
sh
∂V h(qA)
∂ch
xhk∑
h
xh
k
λ
− 1 (9)
Equation 9 shows that the normalized marginal deadweight loss is lower the
lower is the level of mindedness of social groups. Thus a society where the
presence of single-minded groups is lower is undoubtly better off.
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